Training: A Powerful Way to Prevent Fraud by Strand, Carolyn et al.
reventing fraud is a big responsibility for
all levels of financial management—
manager, controller, and CFO. Since man-
agers are responsible for preventing and
detecting fraud, they must constantly ask themselves,
“What more can we do?”
Most fraud is discovered through internal controls,
auditors, and employees who notice suspicious activities.
Therefore, you may want to consider training fiscal
employees and managers to detect fraud.
Training offers several benefits. Well-trained employees
can protect your company by identifying suspicious activ-
ity. Training provides an effective way to communicate
management’s commitment to ethical operations. If
employees and external auditors see that management is
serious about reducing fraud, training could help control
audit fees by reducing the time the external auditor must
spend on fraud assessment.
An important component of anti-fraud training is the
case study. Surveys of corporate training directors indi-
cate that case studies help users develop problem-solving
skills, critical thinking, and judgment. They also empha-
size intuitive thinking rather than rule-based thinking.
Further, case analysis allows trainees to experience the
challenge of putting meaningful clues together. This is
particularly important because it’s often hard to put clues
together in a timely fashion—the average time to detect
misappropriation of assets is two to three years.
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The case study we present here is based on the content
and guidance contained in Statement on Auditing Stan-
dards (SAS) No. 82, “Consideration of Fraud in a Finan-
cial Statement Audit.” It has three learning objectives:
1. Help employees identify risk factors and explain how
these clues might help identify wrongdoing,
2. Help employees identify features of schemes that make
them difficult to detect, and 
3. Help employees identify characteristics of perpetrators
that make misappropriation difficult to detect.
The case introduces employees to several clues usually
associated with fraud, including four control risk factors
contained in SAS No. 82:
◆ Lack of management oversight,
◆ Lack of timely and appropriate documentation for
transactions,
◆ Lack of appropriate segregation of duties or indepen-
dent checks of performance, and 
◆ Discrepancies in accounting records, such as when
payments are made but inventory purchases can’t be
identified.
THE  CLUES
As a first step in the training, have the instructor give
each employee a copy of the information included in 
Figures 1-4.
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Figure 1: Background
The foundation is a highly respected, well-known charity. Susan, the executive
director, has improved its fiscal health and regional prominence over the past
decade. As a result, the nonprofit organization is now in a position to be much
more influential in helping the local community as well as citizens of the sur-
rounding area.
Although it has grown steadily, the number of employees has not increased
due to the uncertainty of the donor base and the level of available contribu-
tions. The assets of the organization are more than $30 million, and this
year’s annual operating budget is just over $15 million. The director of finance controls the budget closely to be 
certain the foundation doesn’t exceed the expected level of yearly contributions.
The foundation doesn’t have an internal audit staff. For more than a decade, the foundation engaged the CPA
firm of West & West, but seven years ago the auditor-in-charge identified financial irregularities and recommended
Susan’s termination. 
The Board of Directors accepted Susan’s explanation that she was so eager to improve the nonprofit’s financial
position that some policies and procedures were overlooked. She agreed to repay the $30,000 in question. West &
West resigned, and a new CPA firm was engaged. No further instances of inappropriate use of funds were noted.
Figure 2: The Foundation’s
Organizational Chart
Board of Directors
Executive Director
(Susan)
Director of Finance
(Doug)
Bookkeeper #1
(Hiroshi)
Bookkeeper #2
(Mary)
After the employees finish reading
the materials, ask them to write out
short answers to the following ques-
tions. Then initiate discussion.
Discussion Questions
1. Do you think Mary is a competent
employee?
2. Is Mary pushing off some of her
work on Hiroshi? 
3. Do you think Hiroshi is a compe-
tent employee?
4. Do you think Doug is a competent
employee?
5. Do you think an employee theft of
assets may be occurring?
6. If you think theft may be occurring,
who is the most likely suspect?
Why?
Most likely, some employees will
speculate about a possible theft, and
they are eager to know if their suspi-
cions are correct. But the first four
questions are actually distractions so
that the intent of the case isn’t too
transparent. Disclosing the answers is
usually most effective if saved until the
end of the discussion.
ADDING  I T  UP  
Once the trainees have shared their
responses, the instructor may intro-
duce the specific risk factors in the sce-
nario. First, ask the participants if
Hiroshi was able to find all of the fur-
niture and computers that were
invoiced for payment. (This corre-
sponds with the risk factor related to
discrepancies in the accounting
records.) Since he was only able to
identify some furniture and none of
the computers, this suggests a possible
concern with inventory levels.
Another risk factor is missing docu-
mentation. The trainer might ask if
anyone thinks this should be a matter
of concern. Apparently, the executive
director is requesting numerous reim-
bursements, but she doesn’t give the
accounting clerks the appropriate doc-
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Figure 3: The Employees
1. Executive Director. Susan has worked
for the nonprofit for about 12 years and is
involved with a variety of well-respected service
organizations. During her tenure, the founda-
tion’s stature has improved dramatically. Susan
recruited several prominent citizens who signifi-
cantly increased the foundation’s resources.
2. Director of Finance. Doug joined the foundation a little more
than seven years ago. He has a degree in accounting and more than
20 years’ experience with similar organizations across the country. He
has a loud, assertive personality and is physically imposing at 6’10”.
3. Bookkeeper #1. Hiroshi has a degree in accounting from an
Asian university and about 10 years’ experience in his home country.
When he moved to the United States two years ago, the foundation
hired him to be responsible for accounts payable.
4. Bookkeeper #2. Mary, who earned her associate degree in
accounting at a community college, has worked for the foundation for
almost nine years. She is responsible for payroll, travel reimbursement,
and corporate credit cards.
Figure 4: The Scenario
◆ Over the past six months, Hiroshi noticed a number of invoices for
computers and furniture. He felt uncomfortable asking the executive
director or director of finance about the purchases, so he decided to
look around. He noticed a few new pieces of furniture in Susan’s office. 
◆ Each Tuesday evening the foundation runs checks for invoices due
that week. Wednesday mornings, Hiroshi verifies the amount of each
check with the register and confirms that all supporting documents are
attached. After reviewing the register and documentation, he mails the
checks. But this week, Hiroshi is concerned about one of the checks. It
is for travel reimbursement to the executive director, but no supporting
documentation is attached. Hiroshi speaks with Mary, reminding her
that she still has not given him documentation for several such reim-
bursement requests in the past.
◆ Hiroshi checks with their supervisor, Doug, the direc-
tor of finance. Doug tells him Susan is vacationing in
Europe for a couple of weeks. He says he’ll check with her
as soon as she returns. While Hiroshi and Doug are talk-
ing, a contractor comes to Doug’s office with a construction
invoice. Doug hands the invoice to Hiroshi and tells him to
process it, using the account code for the foundation’s new building.
umentation to substantiate the payments.
Missing documentation may suggest con-
trol problems, but it could also be an
important clue to employee theft.
The next question is whether Doug han-
dled the contractor’s invoice appropriately.
Doug simply handed it to Hiroshi and told
him which account to use for payment.
Although we would like more information,
it appears that Doug is being far
too casual about this vendor pay-
ment. Hiroshi should try to vali-
date the vendor, the work that was
done, and the materials that were
used so he can be satisfied that the
work actually related to the con-
struction of the foundation’s new
building. The new building should
have a list of approved vendors
who may legitimately claim
reimbursement.
Many training aids assume the
perpetrator is at a lower level of
the organization than the person who detects the fraud.
In such cases, the person in charge may decide the level of
punishment and the degree to which the incident should
be disclosed. The interesting twist in this case is that the
perpetrators are supervisors, and the individuals who
detect the wrongdoing are subordinates. Thus, the per-
sonal concerns (loss of job) and the ethical dilemma
(supervisor wrongdoing) combine to present a more
complicated situation.
This case is based on two actual instances of misappro-
priation of assets by two persons in authority at the same
charity. In the first case, the executive director misappro-
priated $30,000. The foundation’s CPA firm resigned
because the Board wouldn’t fire Susan, who remained in
charge for more than a decade.
After about seven years, she started misusing assets
again. She charged personal expenses on the corporate
credit card and wasn’t required to produce receipts. These
expenses included expensive foreign travel and resort
vacations for Susan and her husband, personal comput-
ers, home furnishings, the cost of entertaining, and gifts
for family. The total exceeded $250,000.
The second fraud was perpetrated by Doug, the direc-
tor of finance. Doug hired a contractor to remodel his
home at the same time the foundation was building a
new office building. When Doug received the invoices for
the work on his house, he directed the
bookkeeper to code the work as part of
the foundation’s project and to process the
invoices for payment. The fraud totaled
over $100,000.
NEW CASES
If an anti-fraud trainer wants more case
studies, they are easy to develop. The trainer
can search newspapers, magazines,
and business journals for recent
incidents. Next, he/she should
identify risk factors from SAS No.
82 that were present. The trainer
can use those factors to determine
whether the employees recognize
them in a different context.
But what can an organization
do when a subordinate knows—
or suspects—fraud is taking
place? Or maybe the employee
knows accounting policies and
procedures have been circum-
vented but doesn’t challenge the supervisor.
First, consider installing an employee hotline so lower-
level employees can report such instances anonymously.
Second, management at all levels must be committed to
ethical standards and a code of conduct that is well-
known throughout the organization.
Also, consider the benefit of ongoing fraud training.
Making sure employees can identify risk factors on a reg-
ular basis helps them become more sensitive to clues of
“misappropriation in action.” The more employees you
have who can identify risks, the more power you have to
detect—and deter—fraudulent activity. ■
A presentation-ready version of these case materials is
available from the first author.
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But what can an
organization do 
when a subordinate
knows—or 
suspects—fraud is
taking place? 
